The periodicity of pricing. by Bronnenberg, B.J.J.A.M. et al.
Journal of Marketing Research
Vol. XLIII (August 2006), 477–493 477
© 2006, American Marketing Association
ISSN: 0022-2437 (print), 1547-7193 (electronic)
*Bart J. Bronnenberg is Associate Professor of Marketing, Anderson
School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles (e-mail:
bart.bronnenberg@anderson.ucla.edu). Carl F. Mela is Professor of Mar-
keting (e-mail: mela@duke.edu), and William Boulding is Professor of
Marketing (e-mail: bb1@mail.duke.edu), Fuqua School of Business, Duke
University. The authors thank Vithala Rao for comments on a previous ver-
sion of this article and the anonymous JMR reviewers. They also thank the
Kilts Center at the University of Chicago for providing the Dominick’s
data set.
BART J. BRONNENBERG, CARL F. MELA, and WILLIAM BOULDING*
Retail pricing data combine multiple decisions (e.g., regular pricing
and discounting) that are possibly made by multiple decision makers
(e.g., retailers and manufacturers). For example, temporary price
reductions (high-frequency price changes) can be used to price
discriminate in the short run, whereas regular price adjustments (low-
frequency price changes) might reflect changes in long-term costs or
demand.Time disaggregation cannot disentangle these factors, because
frequency aggregation exists even when data are analyzed at the lowest
possible level of temporal aggregation. Because little is known about the
nature of pricing interactions across various planning cycles, this article
develops several empirical generalizations about the role of periodicity in
pricing. Using week–store stockkeeping-unit-level price data in 35
grocery categories, the authors find that (1) cross-brand correlation in
prices occurs at multiple planning horizons, and the planning horizon of
the predominant interaction does not typically coincide with the sampling
rate of the data; (2) aggregating pricing interactions across frequencies
obscures distinct and different interactions; (3) pricing interactions are
related to category- and brand-specific factors, such as mean
interpurchase times; (4) regular price changes explain most of the
variation in prices; and (5) periodicity can affect inferences about the
nature of competition within a category. The authors conclude by
discussing several practical marketing applications for which marketing 
decisions across frequencies have relevance.
The Periodicity of Pricing
tion are important issues to bear in mind,” and Pauwels and
colleagues (2004, p. 176) add, “as there is increasing evi-
dence that the same relationship need not hold among two
variables at different frequencies, various substantive mar-
keting problems may warrant further investigation along
that dimension.”
Weekly pricing data embed both regular price decisions
(which may change on an infrequent basis) and temporary
price reductions (which may occur more frequently).
Although these multiple decisions are agglomerated into a
single pricing series, the goals of short- and long-term pric-
ing, as well as consumer response to them, may be different
(Shaffer and Zhang 2002). For example, a manufacturer
might use discounts to collude against weaker brands (Lal
1990), price discriminate among brand switchers (Farris
and Quelch 1987), or increase consumption. In contrast,
regular price changes might reflect changes in overall cost
structure, demand, or market structure. Likewise, retailers
might choose to use discounts to drive category profitability
or store choice or to shift inventory costs to consumers
(Blattberg, Eppen, and Lieberman 1981). Contributing to
differences in the periodicity of pricing are the response
latencies inherent in pricing interactions. Although retailers
can change prices fairly readily, manufacturers’ ability to
Empirical research pertaining to the measurement and
prediction of competitors’ price interactions is pervasive in
the marketing literature (e.g., Gatignon 1984; Hanssens
1980; Lambin, Naert, and Bultez 1975). More recently, con-
siderable attention has been devoted to the dynamics inher-
ent in competitor price interactions (Dekimpe and Hanssens
1999; Leeflang and Wittink 1992, 1996, 2001; Nijs et al.
2001; Steenkamp et al. 2005). This work has led to a richer
understanding of competition, engendering the view that
response may occur with some delay. Our aim is to con-
tribute to this literature by considering how pricing interac-
tions differ across various periodicities. Lately, this issue
has received increased interest in the marketing literature.
Kadiyali, Sudhir, and Rao (2001, p. 177) note that “perio-
dicity of decision making and time aggregation/disaggrega-478 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2006
implement price changes at retail can take considerably
longer. According to an industry expert we interviewed,
manufacturer price changes can take six months to filter
into retail prices. In one example, this expert noted that
changes in on-pack pricing were necessary to change prices
at retail, leading to price implementation delays arising
from the production and distribution time associated with
relabeling. Previous research has further documented that
manufacturer price changes can adjust more slowly than
retail price, typically taking 5–13 weeks (Kopalle, Mela,
and Marsh 1999; Leeflang and Wittink 1992, 2001). An
exception to this generalization exists when manufacturers
can obtain competitive dealing schedules from their retail-
ers well in advance of the deals (our communications with
various manufacturers made this apparent). This enables
firms to have sufficient time to anticipate and react to price
changes at retail.
In light of the preceding discussion, we explore differ-
ences in pricing interactions across frequencies using a
large grocer database spanning 35 categories and 166
brands to develop answers to questions such as the
following:
•Is price variation more common at some frequencies than at
others? For example, do regular price changes explain more of
the variation in prices than discounts?
•Are pricing interactions between brands common across all
periodicities, or are there dominant frequencies for pricing
interactions? Does the nature of these interactions differ across
frequencies? Knowledge of the dominant pricing frequencies
is helpful to determine the appropriate frequencies for model-
ing (competitive response to) prices and assessing the potential
for frequency aggregation biases.
1For this illustration, we isolated the short- (long-) term variation in the
data using a high- (low-) pass filter that eliminates variation below or
above quarterly frequencies.
•Are the frequencies at which prices vary and/or interact related
to differences in brand and/or category factors, or are these fre-
quencies common across brands and categories? The frequen-
cies at which prices vary and/or interact lend insight into
decision-making frequencies and goals of various pricing
agents.
•How do price variation and price covariation contrast across
frequencies? Do the predominant pricing frequencies and
interaction frequencies align? To the extent that these differ,
brand-specific pricing factors can differ in relative importance
from the prices of competing brands.
•What are some of the potential implications of frequency
aggregation bias for inferences about competitive response?
To exemplify some of these issues, Figure 1 depicts more
than four years of retail prices per can for two brands of
beer (Budweiser and Miller) in a Dominick’s Finer Food
(DFF) store in Chicago. As is clear from the graph, there are
multiple frequencies represented in the price data. First,
there are higher-frequency oscillations in pricing (occurring
every 4 weeks or so), which are negatively correlated for
Budweiser and Miller (r = –.44).1 To the extent that short-
term price variation is retailer driven, this would suggest
that the retailer tends to promote in alternate weeks
(Krishna 1994). Second, there are lower-frequency price
fluctuations between Budweiser and Miller (occurring
every 25 weeks or so) associated with long-term move-
ments in regular price, which are strongly positively corre-
lated (r = .97). However, despite these strong correlations in
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2Cycles (or periods) and frequencies are inversely related. That is, let-
ting T denote the length of the price cycle (counted in time units) and ω
denote frequency (expressed in radians), we can express the relationship
between planning period and frequency as T = (2π/ω), 0 < ω ≤ π (see also
Harvey 1975).
the short- and long-term pricing, the overall comovement of
these two price series is relatively weak (r = .24). This sim-
ple example provides some descriptive evidence that (1)
price variation exists at multiple frequencies, (2) the nature
of these interactions differs across frequencies, and (3)
aggregating across them can obscure these interactions. We
find similar patterns in other categories.
As do Pauwels and colleagues (2004), we contend that
little is known about pricing in the frequency domain rela-
tive to the vast literature on price interactions in the time
domain. In addressing these issues, we note that periodicity
aggregation is distinct from time aggregation (Leone 1995).
Even when data are disaggregated to the shortest data inter-
val, multiple decision makers and multiple decisions remain
combined in the data. Indeed, as data are sampled at higher
frequencies (e.g., weekly versus monthly), more interac-
tions become intermingled in the pricing series. As such,
the literature on time aggregation provides limited insights
into the periodicity of decision making.
This article proceeds as follows: Next, we outline the
methods used to illustrate our points. Then, we discuss the
data and present the results of the analysis. A key finding is
that, empirically, the periodicity of price interactions differs
in general from the sampling rate of the data. We explore
further implications of our findings by showing that the fre-
quency of price interactions can affect statistical inferences
about the nature of price competition. Finally, we offer our
conclusions.
METHOD
To assess the influence of periodicity on competition, we
employ a spectral decomposition of price series. This
descriptive analysis is intended to show how the magnitude
and direction of price interactions depend on a given range
of frequencies, which we denote as “planning horizons.” In
a second-stage analysis, we use regression methods to
determine how the magnitude and direction of price interac-
tions depend on various brand- and category-level variables.
Spectral Decomposition of Price Covariation
Spectral analysis is a technique that creates a (co)vari-
ance decomposition of price data into price cycles at differ-
ent frequencies.2 This technique has been widely applied in
economics and finance (e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev
1997). Although it is used only rarely in marketing (Chat-
field 1974; Parsons and Henry 1972), its potential to yield
insights into the periodicity of decision making has led to
increased calls for its application to marketing theory
(Deleersnyder et al. 2004; Lemmens, Croux, and Dekimpe
2004; Pauwels et al. 2004). The technical aspects of spectral
decomposition are well documented (e.g., Hamilton 1994).
Therefore, we relegate all technical aspects of our exact
implementation to Appendix A.
We first consider the “population or power spectrum” of
the pricing series. The spectrum of a pricing series reveals
its proportion of variance at different frequencies. The total
variance of prices can be viewed as the sum of the variance
3The low end of the range is set at two weeks, which implies 26 price
cycles per year. Because prices are set weekly, the shortest complete price
cycle for weekly data is biweekly and, thus, the highest frequency observ-
able in the data.
components across the different frequencies. When pricing
is standardized, the resulting variance components sum to
one across frequencies, and the interpretation of the power
spectrum becomes one of a “spectral distribution,” in which
the value of the spectrum approximates the fraction of vari-
ance that occurs at a given planning cycle. For purposes of
notation, let  denote the spectral power for the price of
brand i in category c and frequency ω. Given the time-
domain data in Figure 1, we expect to observe a strong
spectral component for the beer data at ω≈4 weeks and at
ω≈25 weeks. Panels A and B of Figure 2 confirm this
expectation. Figure 2 depicts the standardized spectra for
the Budweiser and Miller prices. The horizontal axis
depicts the pricing cycle, or planning horizon (in weeks),
which ranges from a high of 50 weeks to a low of 2 weeks.3
The vertical axis in Panels A and B is the power spectrum
standardized in sum to one. The box lots in the graphs rep-
resent the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% percentiles in the
sample distribution of the spectral estimates in the beer
category at each planning horizon (Appendix A outlines the
procedure for estimating these percentiles). The depicted
power spectra reveal considerable pricing variance at ω = 4
and ω = 25.
Just as the pricing variance can be apportioned to differ-
ent frequencies using the decomposition of the spectrum,
covariance can be apportioned using the “cross-spectrum.”
This yields a measure called “coherence,” which captures
the squared correlation between two pricing series at a par-
ticular frequency (see Hassler 1993). The coherence values
range from 0 (no interaction between two competitors at a
particular frequency) to 1 (very strong interaction at a par-
ticular frequency). For purposes of notation, let 
denote coherence for the prices of brand pair {i, i′} in cate-
gory c and frequency (or periodicity) ω. Similar to a corre-
lation measure, the coherence measure is symmetric, that is,
=  . Importantly, coherence measures the pres-
ence of correlation in prices at a particular frequency,
whether competitor price interactions are instantaneous or
lagged. This attractive property ensures that there is no con-
found between price reactions and the timing of those
reactions.
Continuing with the beer example, Panel C in Figure 2
portrays the coherence between Budweiser and Miller using
the data in Figure 1 and controlling for the other major
brands’ prices (i.e., the pricing analysis is multivariate),
including Coors. Figure 2 indicates two areas of high coher-
ence between Budweiser and Miller at 4 and 25 week
cycles. Thus, the combination of the spectra and coherences
reveals that the interaction of prices between Budweiser and
Miller occurs at two empirically important price cycles.
However, as we indicated in our discussion of Figure 1,
prices comove negatively at high frequencies (r = –.44) and
positively at low frequencies (r = .97), so the comovement
across the aggregation of these price cycles (which is the
time series of the prices) is small (r = .24).
In summary, the finding of a strong comovement at spe-
cific frequencies but little comovement in aggregate illus-
trates the potential pitfalls of frequency aggregation. From
hii
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SPECTRAL DECOMPOSITION AND COHERENCE OF SKU PRICES FOR BUDWEISER AND MILLER BEER 12-OUNCE CANS
A: Estimated Spectrum for Budweiser
B: Estimated Spectrum for Miller
C: Estimated Coherence Between Budweiser and Miller
an aggregate correlation, it might be concluded that the
prices of Budweiser and Miller are independent or only
weakly related when, indeed, there are substantial patterns
of price covariation observed across different frequencies.
An alternative approach, which we take here, is to consider
each frequency differently when assessing the degree of
pricing interactions.
Regression
After the spectral decomposition of the data, the next step
of our analysis assesses whether pricing variation, as meas-
ured by the spectrum, and competitor interactions, as meas-
ured by coherence, systematically vary across planning
horizons, category characteristics, and brand characteristics.
Next, we explain how we do this.
Step 1: Categorize the continuous periodicities (ω) into a
discrete number of planning horizons (p = [long, medium,
short]). Following the work of Leeflang and Wittink (1992),
we define short-term reactions as those that occur at inter-
vals of 4 weeks or less (monthly). Leeflang and Wittink
(1992, 2001) note that this cutoff corresponds roughly with
the period in which manufacturers cannot adequately
respond to observed changes in retail price activity. We
denote medium-term reactions as those that occur betweenThe Periodicity of Pricing 481
4We also computed an alternative measure by selecting the most impor-
tant coherence for each planning horizon. We define this measure as the
coherence at the frequency that maximizes the sample mean of coherence
over the sample standard deviation of coherence. This measure yields iden-
tical insights.
5Analgesics, bath soaps, candy bars, cereal, gum, soup, conditioners,
cookies, cola, deodorant, fabric softener sheets, fabric softener liquids,
frozen dinners, frozen entrées, frozen orange juice, graham crackers, apple
juice, liquid dish detergent, liquid laundry detergent, liquid soaps, oatmeal,
refrigerated orange juice, paper towels, toilet paper, razors, beer, saltines,
the 4-week period and the 13-week (quarterly) period. Such
price movements are more likely to include manufacturer
reactions to competitors’ discounting policies and may
include changes in regular price. We define price changes
that occur at greater than a quarterly frequency as longer
term, and these may be more reflective of long-term strate-
gic objectives. Finally, we disregard price changes that
occur with a periodicity of more than 50 weeks to ensure a
sufficient number of cycles to produce a reliable analysis
(with eight years of data, this represents roughly four
cycles). In addition, excluding annual cycles in prices (52
weeks) reduces the risk of inadvertently confusing positive
covariation in prices due to common seasonality in costs
with positive covariation arising from strategic long-term
price matching. Analyzing time series in the frequency
domain lends itself naturally to the exploration of seasonal-
ity effects, which manifest as spikes in the spectrum at the
frequency of the seasonality. For example, in the soup cate-
gory, a cyclical demand that correlates with the winter sea-
son might be expected.
Step 2: Compute the coherence and spectrum for these
discrete planning horizons. Within each planning horizon
(short, medium, long), the coherences and power spectra
exist for all frequencies. To summarize coherence into a
single value for each planning horizon, we compute a
weighted average of the coherence, in which the weights
are the inverse of the sampling error in the estimates of
these statistics at each frequency (for details, see Appendix
A).4 To summarize the spectra into a single value for each
planning horizon, the natural measure is the total fraction of
price variation that falls in each planning horizon.
Step 3: Regress planning horizon, brand, and category
characteristics on coherence. Using regression analysis, we
investigate whether there are important differences in
coherence across brand pairs, categories, and planning hori-
zons. Knowledge of these differences is useful in predicting
when periodicity matters in terms of making inferences
about pricing interactions. Appendix B provides details
about the specification and estimation of the regression
model. Note that the regression accounts for the unobserved
heterogeneity in brand pairs and in categories.
DATA
We used the DFF database for this research (http://
gsbwww.uchicago.edu/kilts/research/db/dominicks/). The
DFF data comprised 400 weeks of store movement data and
thus are well suited to the study of long-term variation in
retail prices. The DFF data contain 29 categories of con-
sumer packaged goods (CPG), though many of these cate-
gories contain multiple subcategories (e.g., grooming prod-
ucts contain razors, shaving cream, and deodorant, among
other subcategories). In total, we conducted spectral analy-
ses on 35 subcategories.5
shredded cheese, shaving cream, shampoo, sliced cheese, snack crackers,
toothbrushes, toothpaste, and tuna fish.
6We also tried a c-spline interpolation, and the results were virtually
identical. Because the number of missing observations is small, alternative
common methods of interpolation probably have inconsequential effects
on our results.
Next, we defined a price index for each brand using the
price the brand charged for the “leading item” in the cate-
gory. From the many Universal Product Codes (UPCs)
within a category, we defined the “leading item” as having
both high levels of demand within the category and a long
duration in the data, so observations for prices are rarely
missing for these items. For example, in bottled juices, we
selected a UPC related to a particular size (64 ounce) and a
particular type of juice (apple) for each of the major brands.
The prices of similar stockkeeping units (SKUs) within a
brand over time are highly correlated. For example, the case
price of Budweiser and Budweiser Light are correlated at
.99 over the data. As such, to the extent that complete pric-
ing is available for different SKUs, the pricing analysis is
typically invariant to the SKU selected as the leading SKU.
We used item-level prices to form the brands’ price
indexes, as opposed to aggregating the brands’prices across
UPCs, to avoid introducing a spurious high-frequency com-
ponent from (1) aggregating across nonsynchronized price
changes and (2) weekly variation in aggregation weights
(e.g., sales). Selecting the same “leading items” across
brands within a category further ensures that we are most
likely to observe price interactions where they exist.
We selected prices from one store (Store 44) because the
number of missing weeks of pricing was small for this
store. Although we used pricing data from one store, DFF’s
use of pricing zones implies that the pricing behavior
reflects its pricing in many stores. Store 44 is in Zone 2,
which comprises 29 of the 88 stores in the data. We use
Store 128 for beer because there are no observations for
beer in Store 44. A limiting factor is that our use of one
store precludes us from explicitly analyzing interstore pric-
ing behavior.
There are a few missing observations scattered about in
the UPC pricing data. When these occur, we set the missing
prices equal to those of the nearest period. This interpola-
tion approach ensures that prices more closely match the
modal prices for regular and sale prices rather than some
point in between.6 In exceptional instances, the series for
one UPC is too short. This can occur when a SKU is dis-
continued and replaced by a similar SKU or when the
retailer stops shelving the SKU. These gaps in prices can
last for months or quarters. In such cases, we resorted to an
average of the prices for the most similar within-brand
UPCs. These series are selected to correlate close to 1.0 for
periods in which they overlap, so this construction should
not attenuate pricing variability.
The number of price series per category ranged from 3 to
9. The 35 categories yielded 166 price series and 348 pairs
of price series. Therefore, for the second-stage analysis, we
have 166 × 3 planning horizons, or 498 observations of the
power spectra, and 348 pairs × 3 planning horizons, or 1044
observations of coherence.
Although we focus on retail prices in our analyses, it is
also possible to use wholesale pricing data to analyze pric-482 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2006
ing behavior. We refrain from doing so for three reasons.
First, many firms have access only to retail prices, so the
most useful approach for these firms focuses on retail
prices. Second, by excluding retailer behavior, the whole-
sale data omit an important player of interest to many firms.
Third, the DFF wholesale prices are not manufacturer
prices to the retailer but rather reflect a weighted average
cost of inventory. As such, it is not purged of retailer behav-
ior, because it includes the effect of retail sales data and
accounting procedures, inhibiting the likelihood of isolating
manufacturer pricing behavior.
RESULTS
Components of Price Cycles and Interaction Among Prices
To assess whether the spectral distributions predomi-
nantly vary with planning horizon (common to brands and
categories) or brand/category factors (common to frequen-
cies), we first discuss a variance decomposition of the spec-
tra and coherence measures along planning horizons, cate-
gories, and brands. This analysis gives a description of the
most salient factors that explain the prevalence of price
cycles.
Components of price cycles. We conduct the following
decomposition of the spectral values  (p), for brand i, cate-
gory c, and planning horizon p:
(1) (p) =  ap + bcp + eicp.
Note that there are no brand and category fixed effects.
The spectra sum to 1 across frequencies for each brand/
category, and thus brand and category main effects cannot
explain variation in  (p). Using our previous definition of
short, medium, and long cycles, we find that the fixed
effects of planning horizon, ap, p = 1, 2, 3, explain 50% of
the variation in the price spectra. This result implies that
brands share similar patterns in their price spectra. In par-
ticular, most price variation occurs in the medium term (4–
13 weeks), and the least price variation occurs in the short
term (2–4 weeks). This emphasis on slower pricing cycles is
surprising in competitive industries, such as detergents,
frozen dinners, and cereals, in which promotions are
endemic. This finding is especially relevant to researchers
who deemphasize the role of regular price variation in mod-
eling sales response (e.g., Kopalle, Mela, and Marsh 1999)
because it suggests that this practice omits much pricing
variation from the analysis. Next, adding the “category–
frequency” interactions, bcp, to the model increases the R-
square to 77%. This category-specific effect suggests the
existence of a category-specific cadence in pricing deci-
sions common to all the brands within a category. The
remainder of the variation in  (p), 23%, is specific to
brand/frequency. In summary, we observe that planning
horizon and category pricing variation (77%) is more preva-
lent than brand-specific pricing variation (23%).
Our inspection of the complete spectra  (ω), ω = 0, ..., π,
across brands and categories yields an additional empirical
generalization: The mass in the spectra is typically concen-
trated in relatively few planning cycles; specifically, the top
20% of frequencies in terms of spectral density mass
account for more than 50% of the variation in prices. As
such, the bulk of price variation arises from relatively few
dicrete price cycles that are category specific. This last











7Note the different scales of Figures 2 and 3. Each box in Figure 2 sums
across multiple cycle lengths in Figure 3. We refrained from plotting
whisker boxes for all cycle lengths to avoid cluttering the graph.
averages spectra for four exemplar categories.7 These
graphs indicate that the majority of variation in the price
data is concentrated in few planning horizons, especially in
the beer and the analgesics categories. Shredded cheese
exhibits two smaller modes of price variation, one at less
than 4 weeks and another at greater than 13 weeks. Impor-
tantly, this suggests that frequencies of interest can be iso-
lated for detailed analyses of competitor interactions.
Price interactions at different price cycles. Analogous to
the fixed effects model in Equation 1, the principal dimen-
sions along which coherence, h (p), varies across brand
pairs ii´, categories c, and planning horizons p can be
described by the following variance decomposition:
(2) h (p) = ap + bcp + dc + 
Unlike the spectral density regression in Equation 1, the
sum of  across ω in Equation 2 differs across cate-
gories. Therefore, we add a category fixed effect.
We find that the effects of planning horizon explain only
modest proportions of the variation in the price interactions.
Approximately 15% of variation in the cross-price interac-
tions stems from the ap (i.e., the common frequency effects
across categories). Thus, there is no common pattern of
coherence for the planning horizons across the categories or
brand pairs. In contrast, the category main effects, dc,
explain 37% of the variation in coherence, suggesting that
differences in coherence can be explained by the nature of
the categories in which brands compete. The two dimen-
sions (frequency and category) are orthogonal, so their
combined effects account for 52% of the variation in coher-
ence. Considering the interactions between the frequencies
and the categories increases the variance explained to 57%.
These results indicate that frequencies of price interactions
are more brand-pair specific than frequencies of price varia-
tion, which tend to be common across brands. However, as
with the spectra, the coherence evidences large components
of variance in the data at the category level. Figure 4 shows
several examples.
The analgesics category has especially high coherence in
the lower-frequency part of the spectrum, indicating that
competitor prices strongly interact at a quarterly and semi-
annual level in this category. The fabric softener category
has low coherence throughout, indicating less overall price
interaction. The beer category, as we discussed previously,
has a strong interaction in the monthly price cycles but also
in the semiannual price cycles. Finally, the shredded cheese
category has a strong interaction at 4-week price cycles
(during which the spectral distribution was also high), but
the same pattern of coherence is not as distinctly reflected
in the 14-week cycle (during which there was another mode
in the spectra). This pattern indicates that pricing interac-
tions might be more independent in the long term for shred-
ded cheese, a conjecture we discuss in greater and more for-
mal detail subsequently.
Collectively, the elements of Figure 4 suggest that
empirical interactions in price occur at multiple price cycles
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EXAMPLES OF SPECTRA IN FOUR CATEGORIES
reflect patterns in the other categories as well. Thus, a key
point from these descriptions of coherence is that in almost
all 35 categories studied, the important frequencies of price
interaction do not coincide with the sample rate of the data
(weekly). This finding is especially important given that, to
our knowledge, all analyses of competition focus on varia-
tion in price at the sampling rate of the data (which is often
weekly).
How Do Empirical Interactions in Price Depend on the
Brand, Category, and Planning Horizon?
Whereas the previous section found significant brand-
pair and category components to coherence, in this section,
we ask whether there are specific brand-pair and category
characteristics that are associated with high or low coher-
ence. To this end, we first explain the descriptor variables
used and their hypothesized effects on coherence. Then, we
discuss the empirical results for coherence. Finally, we
replicate this analysis for the spectra.
Brand-level influences on competitor price interactions.
The list of descriptors we consider here is not exhaustive;
rather, it reflects the confluence of the measures available in
the data and prior findings in the pricing literature. Because
the list of descriptors is not exhaustive, we also account for
unobserved factors at the category and brand level (see
Appendix B). We hypothesize that several factors at the
level of brand pairs affect the pricing interactions. We
denote these brand-pair-level variables (which we define in
Appendix C) as  and they are as follows:
•Within-firm effects. Reflective of common category planning
practices, we expect multiproduct manufacturers to coordinate
prices for their SKUs across different brands within a category.
This would lead to higher coherence in prices among SKUs of
different brands in the category produced by the same
manufacturer.
•Between-firm effects. Price and quality tiers can also affect
price interactions (Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989; Bronnen-
berg and Wathieu 1996). In general, Leeflang and Wittink’s
zii
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EXAMPLES OF COHERENCE IN FOUR CATEGORIES
(2001) survey of managers indicates that competitor interac-
tions are more likely when brands are positioned similarly.
➣Private label. Some private-label store brands are in differ-
ent quality tiers than national brands (Hoch 1996). For
these brands, prices are likely to be independent relative to
more similar brand pairs (thus, the coherence should be
lower). Other store brands are positioned more closely to
the leading national brands (Dhar and Hoch 1997; Say-
man, Hoch, and Raju 2002), suggesting greater coherence
in price. A priori, it is not clear which effect will dominate,
so we make no predictions about the effect of private label
on coherence.
➣Price differential. We expect coherence to be limited for
disparately priced brands, given their differential
positioning.
➣Firm size/revenue differential. When large firms are con-
fronted by pricing action from smaller firms, they may not
perceive the attack as credible or important and therefore
may be more likely to ignore the small firms’ pricing
(Clark and Montgomery 1998). Accordingly, increased
revenue differences may also lead to more independence in
pricing and, thus, lesser coherence. Furthermore, to the
extent that large and small brands are differentially posi-
tioned (e.g., small brands occupy a niche), the coherence is
likely to be lower.
Category-level influences on competitor price interac-
tions. In addition to brand descriptors, we delineate a set of
category descriptors, denoted as vc, that we expect will
moderate price interactions. We draw on the ability–
motivation framework that Boulding and Staelin (1995)
propose, which extends Heider’s (1958) individual-level
model to the firm level, to make predictions about the rela-
tive independence or coordination of pricing across cate-
gories. In the context of pricing, this theory suggests thatThe Periodicity of Pricing 485
price interactions are more likely, to the extent that it is easy
to interact (ability) and the effect of interactions on firm
outcomes is high (motivation). We relate ability and motiva-
tion to the following variables (which we define in Appen-
dix C); all else being equal, we should observe stronger
effects with increasing ability or motivation.
•Industry characteristics. We consider the following industry
factors:
➣Concentration. A dearth of competing products facilitates
firms’ ability to monitor competitors and enables them to
set their prices more reliably (Gale and Branch 1982;
Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson 1999). Thus, we
hypothesize a positive relationship between concentration
and coherence.
➣Volatility. Highly volatile markets with a larger percentage
of products exiting and entering the market can decrease
the ability of organizations to monitor price activity, and
this may reduce coherence in pricing.
•Retailer characteristics. Retailer characteristics may also have
consequences for competitor interactions.
➣Private-label share. As private-label share increases, the
share and revenue of national brands decrease. Therefore,
there is less motivation for manufacturers to coordinate
prices. Accordingly, coherence should decrease for the
manufacturers that constitute the bulk of the market. In
contrast, the importance of the category to the retailer
should increase. As such, we might expect that the
decrease in coherence is not as large for discounts (high-
frequency price variation) as it is for regular price changes,
because retailers tend to have a greater role in setting dis-
counts than regular price changes.
8Other factors may influence price sensitivity as well (Bell, Chiang, and
Padmanabhan 1999). However, our attempts to measure them with a sur-
vey approach yielded variables that are redundant with the information
contained in the aforementioned variables. For example, stockpilability
was highly correlated with interpurchase time.
•Demand characteristics. Increased consumer price sensitivity
is indicative of lower margins and, thus, profits. Accordingly,
when price elasticities are higher, the motivation to coordinate
prices is lower. This leads to increased independence of prices
and, thus, lower coherence.
➣Penetration. Increased penetration has been associated
with greater price sensitivity (Narasimhan, Neslin, and Sen
1996). If this association holds, we expect penetration to
contribute to a decrease in coherence.
➣Interpurchase time. Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan
(1999) find that increased interpurchase time leads to
increased price sensitivity. Thus, we expect longer inter-
purchase times to decrease coherence.8
Regression results: coherence. Table 1 presents the
results of the coherence regression, along with the param-
eter signs implied by the foregoing propositions. Table 1
indicates that empirical interactions in price depend signifi-
cantly on the brand, category, and planning horizon. Over-
all, the fit of the model with the data is good (R2 = .41), and
the significant results are consistent with our expectations.
Several results merit discussion. With respect to the
brand-level variables, we find that pairs of SKUs from the
same manufacturer have high coherence in pricing. As we
Table 1
REGRESSION RESULTS EXPLAINING THE COHERENCE FOR BRAND PAIRS IN THE SHORT, MEDIUM, AND LONG TERM
Parameter Values by Planning Horizon
Variable (Expected Sign) Long t Medium t Short t
Intercept –1.21 –18.11 ** –1.58 –23.78 ** –2.17 –32.60 **
Brand-Level Variables
Same manufacturer (+) 00.95 008.28 ** 00.94 008.15 ** 01.09 009.43 **
Private label (?) 0–.01 00–.05 0–.05 00–.41 0–.09 00–.77
Price differential (–) 0–.07 0–1.48 0–.10 0–1.98 **0 –.06 0–1.21
Revenue differential (–) 00.04 000.78 00.02 000.50 0–.02 00–.32
Category-Level Variables
Industry Characteristics
Concentration (+) –1.21 00–.52 –1.18 00–.51 02.66 001.15
Volatility (–) 0–.01 00–.95 00.00 00–.33 00.01 000.55
Retailer Characteristics
Private label share (–) –3.19 0–3.03 ** –2.62 0–2.49 ** –2.40 0–2.28 **
Demand Characteristics
Penetration (–) 0–.01 00–.95 0–.16 00–.33 00.03 000.06
Interpurchase time (–) 00.18 000.37 0–.41 00–.75 –1.24 0–2.25 **
Random Effect Variances
Brand-pair effects, σ2
ε 00.58 021.23 **
Category/periodicity effects, σ2
η 00.28 007.52 **
Model error, σ2




*p < .05 (two-tailed).
**p < .01 (two-tailed).
Notes: Negative effects denote lower coherence.486 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2006
expected, multibrand firms coordinate price changes of dif-
ferent brands within the same category. This effect on
coherence is positive in all three time horizons.
The effect of price differential is negative, as we
expected, but only significantly so for the medium term.
Thus, brands that are in different price tiers tend to have
less coordination in prices, especially in regular prices.
With respect to category-level characteristics, the effect
of private-label share is strongly negative, but less so in the
short term. This result is consistent with the ability–
motivation framework we outlined previously (i.e., a
reduced motivation to coordinate prices).
Finally, as we expected, for products with high interpur-
chase times, there is less coherence, but only for short-term
pricing. That is, frequent promotional price changes are
more likely to be coordinated across brands in categories
that have a low interpurchase time. This result is also con-
sistent with the ability–motivation framework insofar as
purchase frequency increases category size and, putatively,
motivation.
Regression results: spectrum. We can specify a similar
regression for the spectra, with some modifications. First,
because the spectra sum to one, we use an attraction model
to analyze the portion of variance in a particular planning
horizon. Second, because of the same sum constraint, there
is no main effect of category or brand descriptors. Third,
because most of the variation in the spectra is explained by
planning-horizon main effects, we focus on only a few other
informative variables. Table 2 presents the results of the
regression.
Two results are particularly noteworthy. First, the effect
of brand size, standardized within category, is larger in the
short term than in the long or medium term. This means that
larger brands in a category have more variance in short
price cycles than smaller brands. In other words, larger
brands display larger short-term price changes than the
smaller brands, possibly serving as retail loss leaders. Sec-
ond, compared with categories with short and medium
interpurchase times, long-term price cycles are more preva-
lent for categories with a long interpurchase time. Thus, as a
simple heuristic, the importance of price cycles of different
planning horizons seems to follow consumers’ interpur-
chase times. Finally, note that the first effect is a within-
category (i.e., brand) effect, whereas the second is a cross-
category effect. As such, the two are independent. In sum-
mary, using a large database covering 166 brands derived
from 35 CPG categories, we document several new descrip-
tive empirical generalizations about how price (co)variation
changes systematically across planning horizons, cate-
gories, and brands.
INFERRING COMPETITIVE RESPONSES
Competitive Inferences at Alternative Planning Cycles: An
Overview
Thus far, we have argued that multiple decisions are rep-
resented in weekly pricing data and that some of these deci-
sions reflect multiple planning cycles and reaction speeds.
In support of this contention, we have shown that pricing
interactions differ across planning cycles and that, in gen-
eral, the dominant pricing interaction does not comport with
the sample rate of the data. It is possible to extend these
insights by considering the roles of demand and costs in the
periodicity of pricing. Accordingly, in this section, we take
our analysis a step further and show—again, using spectral
decomposition—that the impact of periodicity on statistical
inferences about price-setting behavior can be nontrivial. To
accomplish this goal, we specify an empirical model to
infer demand and competitive response; we then estimate it
and offer an explanation of how periodicity affects the
results.
Consider demand qi a function of own prices pi and
competitive prices pj, j ≠ i,
(3) qi = f(pi , pj).
Under the assumption of constant marginal cost ci, the first-
order condition on profit maximization is that
Substituting a linear demand equation for ease of exposi-
tion, where bii indicates an own-price response coefficient
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Table 2
LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS EXPLAINING THE VARIATION OF PRICES IN THE SHORT, MEDIUM, AND LONG TERM
Parameter Values by Planning Horizon
Variable Long t Medium t Short t
Intercept –.89 –12.21 ** .00 — –.65 –8.86 **
Standardized revenue –.03 00–.72 .00 — 0.19 05.04 **
Penetration 1.42 002.64 ** .00 — 0.47 00.88
Interpurchase time 1.52 002.54 * .00 — –.93 –1.55
Random Effect Variances
Category/periodicity effects, σ2
η 0.37 008.80 **
Model error, σ2




*p < .05 (two-tailed).
**p < .01 (two-tailed).
Notes: Parameters for the medium-term planning horizon are 0, to set a metric.The Periodicity of Pricing 487
where bii < 0 and bij > 0.
With Bertrand–Nash competition, all players take one
another’s actions as given; that is, Bertrand–Nash behavior
is inferred if ∂pj/∂pi = 0. Conversely, if player i believes that
raising its price will make player j do the same, then ∂pj/
∂pi > 0. Given the signs of bii and bij, the latter condition is
associated with higher margins and therefore is taken as an
indication of “soft” competition or “cooperative” behavior.
Conversely, finding that ∂pj/∂pi < 0 is associated with lower
margins and is taken as evidence of noncooperative
conduct.
To categorize the nature of competition, one approach
has been to simply infer ∂pj/∂pi using the model and empiri-
cal data. Such inferences depend on the estimates for bii and
bij, which, we show, may depend on the periodicity in the
data. In contrast, quantities and profit margins do not
depend on whether the researcher uses quarterly or weekly
data. Therefore, Equations 4 and 5 suggest that the empiri-
cal estimate for the sum bii + bij × (∂pj/∂pi) should be invari-
ant to whether the weekly or quarterly information in the
data is used. If bii is more negative with weekly data than
with quarterly data, and if bij remains largely unaffected, it
is easily verified that (∂pj/∂pi) is higher when it is inferred
from weekly rather than quarterly data. The intuition behind
this statement is that margins should shrink when price sen-
sitivity increases. Under the preceding assumptions, the
equality of margins across regimes of different frequencies
forces the inference of cooperation when price response is
high. Crucially, this statement builds on the scenario that
the only thing that changes across data of different frequen-
cies is own-price response bii. Although this “all-else-being-
equal” condition substantively holds in our empirical exam-
ple, we do not wish to suggest that it holds in general. Still,
if inferences about other parameters change across data of
different frequency, it would be a coincidence if the infer-
ence about the responses ∂pj/∂pi remained unaffected.
To test this conjecture, we chose a category with two
national brands and a private label: shredded cheese. We
selected the shredded cheese category because (1) it has a
mode in the spectra in both the longer and the shorter terms
(see Figure 3), so it is expedient to contrast them, and (2)
we have exact knowledge of the variable costs in this cate-
gory through consultation with a former category manager
of one of the major firms in the industry.
To make inferences about competitive response, we adopt
a demand specification similar to that of Kadiyali, Chinta-
gunta, and Vilcassim (2000). We specify the demand for
brand i as
(6) qi = ai + bip1 + cip2 + dip3 + gi × ddshifti,
where p1 is the price of Kraft shredded cheese, p2 is the
price of Sargento shredded cheese, and p3 is the price of the
store brand. As in the work of Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and
Vilcassim (2000, p. 132), we find that the log–log, semilog,
and linear demand models are comparable in empirical fit.
Our goal is to show that competitive interactions can differ
across planning horizons, and a linear model is sufficient
for this purpose.














9To explore the robustness of our findings to this 4-week cutoff, we also
used decompositions below and above 13 weeks, which yielded the same
results.
The demand shifters (ddshifti) used here include the total
demand of competing brands in the outside stores (i.e.,
stores other than the one used in estimation) and monthly
dummies (Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim 2000). We
can show (see Appendix D) that the estimation equations
for shredded cheese are given by
(7) q1 = a1 + b1p1 + c1p2 + d1p3 + g1 × ddshift1,
q2 = a1 + b2p1 + c2p2 + d2p3 + g2 × ddshift2,
q3 = a3 + b3p1 + c3p2 + d3p3 + g3 × ddshift3,
mp1 = mc1 + γ1q1,
mp2 = mc2 + γ2q2,
r1 = α1q1 + α2r2 + α3r3,
r2 = α4q2 + α5r2 + α6r3, and
r3 = α7q3 + α8r2 + α9r3,
where mpi is the manufacturer price of brand i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
mci is the manufacturer cost, and ri is the retailer markup
for brand i.
In Appendix D, we also show that deviations from the
Nash condition in the manufacturer pricing equations (mpi)
are given by ki = –(1/γi)–  b i ≠ 0, i ∈ {1, 2}. Given estimates
for the mean and variance of γi and bi, it is possible to
obtain estimates for the variance of ki and therefore test for
deviations from Nash. Support for our conjecture that
higher elasticities in the short term lead to greater inference
of cooperation would manifest as ki being significantly
greater in the short term than in the long term.
To isolate the high- and low-frequency components in the
data, we use the spectra to identify the frequency at which
the data should be split. The spectral distribution for shred-
ded cheese (see Figure 3) indicates differences in pricing at
a frequency less than or equal to 4 weeks and a frequency of
more than 4 weeks (with another mode near 14 weeks). The
4-week frequency is consistent with Leeflang and Wittink’s
(1992) typology for the frequency of long- and short-term
pricing interactions. Accordingly, we filtered the shredded
cheese category at 4 weeks to select these two frequency
components for analysis (see Hamilton 1994).9 For each
frequency component (high and low), we estimated the sys-
tem of equations in Equation 7 using linear three-stage least
squares with the lagged prices and quantities in outside
stores and the store under investigation as instruments.
Competitive Inferences at Alternative Planning Cycles:
Results
The key parameter estimates from the structural model
appear in Table 3, and the own- and cross-price coefficients
exhibit face validity. In Table 3, we observe that own-price
sensitivity is higher in the high-frequency data than in the
low-frequency data. Furthermore, we observe that the cross-
price sensitivity does not increase with high-frequency data
as much. A potential explanation for this pattern is that the
bulk of the short-term price effect comes from shifting
demand around in time rather than across brands.488 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2006
Table 3
STRUCTURAL MODEL RESULTS
Low Frequency High Frequency
Parameter Value t Value t
Demand Equations
Kraft Demand
Price Kraft (b1) –1568.12 –14.00 –2928.24 –27.30
Price Sargento (c1) 00928.11 005.70 01010.44 004.64
Price Dominick’s (d1) 01119.68 006.93 0–169.20 00–.95
Sargento Demand
Price Kraft (b2) 00927.19 008.40 00536.20 004.11
Price Sargento (c2) –1505.25 –10.35 –2005.80 –16.97
Price Dominick’s (d2) 00–19.47 00–.15 00–90.98 00–.77
Dominick’s Demand
Price Kraft (b3) 01496.32 005.40 01706.18 003.75
Price Sargento (c3) 01012.72 002.71 0–485.72 00–.84
Price Dominick’s (d3) –4113.34 –13.13 –4766.57 –10.78
Manufacturer Pricing Rules
Kraft Rule
Quantity Kraft (γ1) .000582 30.41 .000608 036.09
Sargento Rule
Quantity Sargento (γ2) .000694 32.20 .000777 050.93
Retailer Pricing Rules
Kraft Rule
Quantity Kraft (a1) –.00017 –15.49 –.00014 –21.29
Markup Sargento (a2) .728 10.72 .276 004.60
Markup Dominick’s (a3) .245 04.73 .031 000.69
Sargento Rule
Quantity Sargento (a4) –.00014 –14.94 –.00012 –13.00
Markup Kraft (a5) .390 11.23 0.170 003.47
Markup Dominick’s (a6) .226 06.31 –.079
0–1.84
Dominick’s Rule
Quantity Dominick’s (a7) –.00009 –15.39 –.00008 –19.52
Markup Kraft (a8) .248 04.88 0.069 001.23
Markup Sargento (a9) .640 09.20 0.003 000.04
System-Weighted R2 0.73 000.70
To test for deviations from Nash explicitly, we calculate
the ki and its variance using the delta method, or Cramer’s
theorem (Mela, Gupta, and Lehmann 1997). Table 4 pres-
ents these results. Using the low frequencies in the data, we
infer that the manufacturers compete in a Nash equilibrium
because ki is not significantly different from 0 for either
national brand. Conversely, using the high-frequency data,
we infer that the game deviates significantly from Nash
because ki > 0 for both national brands. This estimate for ki
implies that cooperation is inferred to be greater in the short
run. Thus, this example illustrates that inference about com-
petition depends on which frequencies in the data are used
for analysis. The differences between long and short run are
significant, with t = 9.16 for k1 and t = 3.19 for k2.
A tentative explanation for these findings arises for the
case in which promotional price response (and elasticity) is
greater than regular price response (e.g., Blattberg, Briesch,
and Fox 1995). Because our estimates for own-price
response for the national brands are 30%–90% greater for
high-frequency data, this implies that the inferred level of
cooperation should be higher. An alternative explanation is
suggested by Lal (1990), who shows that leading brands
collude through their promotions to lock out lower-quality
brands. Note that implicit collusion in short-term pricing is
Table 4
MANUFACTURING PRICING RULE PARAMETERS
Low Frequency High Frequency
Parameter Value t Value t
k1 –150.09 –1.44 1283.50 11.00
k2 64.33 .39 718.80 5.95The Periodicity of Pricing 489
possible when manufacturers learn about promotion sched-
ules in advance from the retailer. In summary, we conclude
that our inferences about the nature of the competitive game
vary with periodicity and that, in our particular example,
more cooperative conduct is inferred with the high-
frequency data than with the low-frequency data.
CONCLUSION
Prior literature suggests that price data reflect multiple
decisions and multiple decision makers (e.g., retailers and
manufacturers) and that these decisions manifest as differ-
ent pricing interactions across different planning horizons.
In this article, we investigated retail prices of CPG products
using a decomposition in different planning horizons or
price cycles. As such, we follow calls by Kadiyali, Sudhir,
and Rao (2001) and Pauwels and colleagues (2004) to ana-
lyze pricing interactions across periodicities. In the process,
we enumerated five research questions and addressed them
as follows.
First, is price variation more common at some frequen-
cies than at others? We find that most of the observed varia-
tion in price results not from rapid pricing vacillation but
rather from slower, less-frequent pricing movements. This
is surprising in light of the emphasis on discounts over
regular pricing in both academic and corporate research.
Second, are there dominant frequencies for pricing inter-
actions? If so, do the nature of these interactions differ
across frequencies? In our analysis, we find that pricing
interactions are more common with regular price changes,
but in general, they occur across the entire spectrum. Of
additional interest, pricing interactions in the short term
sometimes offset those in the long term. For example,
prices in the beer category are positively correlated in the
long term and negatively correlated in the short term. These
interactions cancel out when they are aggregated across fre-
quencies, suggesting the potential for a frequency aggrega-
tion bias. Importantly, frequency aggregation differs from
time aggregation. Whereas time aggregation issues can be
redressed by increasing the sampling frequency of the data,
this does not solve the potential for frequency aggregation.
Rather, increasing the sample rate adds a high-frequency
component to an already existing set of lower-frequency
components. To disentangle the price data into meaningful
decision cycles, a filtering approach appears promising (see
also Deleersnyder et al. 2004; Lamey et al. 2005).
Third, are the frequencies at which prices vary and/or
interact related to differences in brand and/or category fac-
tors, or are these frequencies common across brands and
categories? We find that the price cycles and periodicities at
which prices interact have a strong category component that
is common to the brands in a category. Our analysis lends
some empirical legitimacy to a “category cadence” in pric-
ing decisions. Analyzing the spectra and coherences using
descriptors of planning horizons, categories, and brands, we
find that coherence is higher for brands from the same
manufacturer and those in the same price tier. As the
retailer’s private-label share in the category decreases,
coherence of brands in the category increases. For the spec-
tra, as a brand’s share increases and as a category’s pur-
chase cycles become shorter, the relative emphasis on short-
term pricing compared with regular price changes increases.
Our empirical descriptions of the systematic differences in
price (co)variation across categories and planning horizons
may help anticipate high price (co)variation when it exists.
Fourth, how do price variation and price covariation con-
trast across frequencies? Do the predominant pricing fre-
quencies and interaction frequencies align? Although pric-
ing variation is greater in the long-term price cycles, pricing
interactions (price covariation) are more common across the
spectrum. However, a contrast of Figures 3 and 4 suggests
that coherence is likely for the most important price cycles.
That is, large price cycles are often related across brands.
Fifth, what are some of the potential implications of fre-
quency aggregation for inferences about competitive
response? Simply stated, if there are different types of pric-
ing decisions represented at different frequencies, infer-
ences about price responses are potentially confounded. We
show how spectral techniques can be used to isolate specific
frequencies to infer the nature of competitive response at
different planning cycles.
We contend that these findings are novel insofar as there
is little research in marketing that explores the role of peri-
odicity in pricing. Given that there are systematic differ-
ences in periodicities across brands and categories and that
aggregating these frequencies obscures systematic interac-
tions in price, we believe that this study provides an initial
step toward disentangling these differences. Above all, we
hope that our research is taken as a constructive step in the
direction of studying the periodicity of price decision
making.
Beyond this domain, we hope that spectral analyses may
be fruitfully employed to understand the periodicity of deci-
sion making in other marketing contexts. One such applica-
tion is a recent article by Lemmens, Croux, and Dekimpe
(2004), who decompose Granger causality across the spec-
trum in the context of market expectations, an approach that
could also be applied to pricing. In another recent applica-
tion, Deleersnyder and colleagues (2004) and Lamey and
colleagues (2005) link business cycles to sales by using fil-
ters to isolate frequencies of interest. Spectral tools can also
be applied to other elements of the marketing mix and sales
response, such as competitor interactions in advertising or
the effect of short-term pricing variation on long-term
movement in sales. Another direction would be to develop
structural models within the frequency domain to obtain a
more complete view of competitive response and to address
the issue of dynamics in structural models of competition.
Finally, more formal models to integrate periodicity and
decision making could yield interesting insights into
competitive response. Such insights could be generalized
further across categories. We hope that our work sparks
more research in this direction.
APPENDIX A: ESTIMATION OF SPECTRAL MODEL
We employ the following procedure to obtain the spectral
decomposition of the retail pricing series. The discussion is
topical. For more detail, we refer interested readers to the
work of Harvey (1975) or, for a more advanced treatment,
to the work of Hamilton (1994).
Step 1: Filter the Data
Spectral analysis assumes that the data are stationary
(e.g., Nelson and Kang 1981). Augmented Dickey–Fuller
tests on the price series in our data indicate that this is often
not the case. This will bias the apparent power of the lower490 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 2006
10We also used a cutoff of t = 1.0 and t = .0 (no cutoff) to assess the sen-
sitivity of our results to the inclusion of more parameters. The results
remained essentially identical.
frequencies in the data upward. Therefore, we apply a high-
pass filter to the data to eliminate the price cycles with a
length equal to or greater than one year. This filter removes
both random walk and trend components. The coherence
relationships are invariant to filtering when the same linear
filter is applied to all the series; however, the spectral den-
sity is not (see Fishman 1969; Hassler 1993). Filtering the
data controls for linear trends in inflation in costs and prices
and annual seasonality (e.g., food costs).
Step 2: Estimate a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Model
For all prices yict, for brands i = 1, ..., Kc in a category c =
1, ..., C, and for time periods t = 1, ..., T, estimate
where L is the number of lags. The coefficients of this
model, ψcs, are used to compute the spectral decomposition.
Given that regular price changes often show little or no var-
iation for up to six months, we allow for long lag shifts of
up to 26 weeks (i.e., L = 26). We allow for this flexibility
because we wish to explore the long-term price interactions
for which lower-order VAR models may be less appropri-
ate. Conversely, the higher-order VAR models can be heav-
ily parameterized. There is a Kc × Kc coefficient matrix ψ to
be estimated for each lag. With five brands and 26 periods,
this would yield more than 600 parameters for approxi-
mately 1900 observations. Therefore, we follow the stan-
dard practice of zeroing parameters with t-statistics less
than 1.5 (similar to Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999).10 We
proceed in phases by first estimating a VAR model of order
1 and then retaining the parameters with t-statistics greater
than 1.5. We then add a second lag and repeat the process.
This process continues until all L lags are added to the
model.
Step 3: Compute the Spectrum and Cospectrum
The spectrum can be interpreted as the portion of the
variance in a price series attributable to a certain frequency.
Higher power indicates greater price variation at a given
frequency. Then, the cospectrum is analogous to the covari-
ance, and it measures the degree of covariation between two
series at a given frequency. We use the coefficient matrices
ψcs to compute the complete power spectrum (Hamilton
1994). Defining  the spectrum at frequency
ω = 0, ..., π is a square matrix of size Kc that is equal to
where j = √–1. In our empirical work, the complex matrix
is computed at discrete ω = [0, .01 π, .02 π, ..., π]. Sc() ω
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We refer to the resulting series  as the
“power spectrum.” Unlike power spectra estimated from
bivariate VAR models, our approach controls for the
observed effects of all other brands’ prices because we esti-
mate the VAR on the full set of prices.
Step 4: Compute the Coherence
We define for each pair of brands  and  the following
four quantities:
where im{arg} is the imaginary part and re{arg} is the real
part of its arguments. The factor q is called the “quadra-
ture” and c is called the “cospectrum.” We compute
coherence as follows:
Note that the coherence measure is symmetric; it is anal-
ogous to an R-square measure in regression and measures
the strength of association between two series at different
frequencies. When we standardize the spectrum  to
sum to one across frequencies, it yields the spectral distri-
bution, which we denote as  .
Step 5: Compute the Moments of Coherence
Note that there is no confidence interval around Equation
A4. To approximate such an interval, we generate 100
draws from the sampling distribution of the estimated VAR
parameters of Equation A1, and we use these draws to
obtain an empirical distribution for the power spectrum and
the resulting measure in Equation A4. This procedure
makes it possible to ascertain which frequencies are associ-
ated with tightly distributed coherences.
Step 6: Compute the Planning-Cycle-Level Coherence
We aggregate across coherences within a planning cycle
by computing a weighted average of the sample mean of
coherence at each frequency. The weights we use are the
sample variances of the coherence at each frequency. More
specifically,
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION OF CROSS-TIME, BRAND,
AND CATEGORY EFFECTS
We first specify the coherence regression and discuss its
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which employs the same estimation approach. After collect-
ing the coherences across planning horizons p = (long,
medium, short), brand pairs ii′ = 1, ..., Nc, and categories
c = 1, ..., C, we then estimate the following regressions for
coherence,
where p is planning horizon, v′ c are category-level variables,
and  z are brand-level variables. The  are within-
category/-horizon random effects, the ξ are within-
brand-pair effects, and the ξ are the observational errors.
We specify these random effects to account for potential
correlations across observations within the same time hori-
zon and category as well as within the same brand pair
across time horizons (because, strictly speaking, these
coherence estimates are not independent replicates, and
failure to accommodate correlations among these repeated
measures might overstate the power of the fixed effects).
We specify ξ ~ IIDN (0,  ),  ~ IIDN (0,  ), and
ε ~ IIDN (0,  ), and we assume that these three errors
are independent.
Given that coherence is constrained to lie between 0 and
1, we use the logistic transform of coherence, which is
given by ln(hii′(ω)/[1 – hii′{ω}]). Note that the transform is
taken before we compute any sample moments. Note also
that the hii′cp are estimates. However, Equation B1 does not
consider sample error. To check the robustness of our
results to sample error in hii′cp, we replicated the regression
using 100 draws from the empirical distribution of hii′cp.
The empirical distribution of the estimates for the regres-
sion parameters of interest in the second-stage regression
differs negligibly from what we reported in the article.
Thus, the component of the covariance structure of the
within-category covariation of coherence is the variance
structure of  + ξ across all c; that is,
where N =  To obtain the covariance matrix for the
system stacked across brand pairs, categories, and planning
horizons, we combine Λ with the brand-pair random effects.
The resulting covariance matrix is given by
where I3 is a three-dimensional identity matrix, IN is an N-
dimensional identity matrix, and ι ι3ι ι′3 is a 3 × 3 matrix of
ones. Thus, Ω is dimensioned 3N × 3N.
We use maximum likelihood to estimate the model
parameters We  define
=  –  –  –  We array these residuals
across brand pairs and categories so that we obtain an N × 1
vector ep; let the N × 3 matrix u ≡ [e0 e1 e2]. Then, the like-
lihood function is proportional to
′ ′ zii c p
h β . ′ vcp
h α δ0p
h hii cp ′ eii cp
h
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After taking the log of the likelihood and simplifying (Mag-
nus 1982), we can write the log-likelihood function as
(ignoring an irrelevant constant),
where A =  B =  and the log
of the determinant can be shown to equal (using some
results on determinants in Magnus [1982] and Searle
[1982])
Note that when the log-likelihood is expressed in this form,
it requires only an inversion of a block diagonal N × N
matrix, which is much smaller than Ω. Estimation proceeds
by maximizing Equation B5 over θ.
We use a similar procedure to estimate the effect of brand
and category factors on the spectral density. Because the
spectral density sums to 1 across periodicities, we use the
following logit regression equation:
To normalize, we arbitrarily and without loss in generality
subtract from Vicp the value Vic2 (p = 2 denotes the medium
term), so that
with  and so forth. Further-
more,  are normally distributed variables with
mean zero and variance  and  . The parameters of inter-
est can be estimated using the linearization
which reduces to a linear system analogous to the system
for coherence (but with two equations given the sum con-
straint in the spectral distribution).
APPENDIX C: VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION
We operationalize the variables in Table 1 as follows:
“Same manufacturer” is an indicator variable that assumes
the value of 1 if the two brands in a given category are pro-
duced by the same manufacturer and 0 if otherwise. Note
that the same manufacturer is not equivalent to the same
brand. “Private label” is an indicator variable that assumes
the value of 1 if one of the brands in the pair is a private-
label brand. “Revenue differential” is the absolute differ-
ence between the mean sales (across time) for the brand
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pairs, and “price differential” reflects the mean per unit
absolute price difference over time. We based both sales dif-
ferential and price differential on standardized series to
make the variables comparable across categories (as units
of volume differ across categories). We substitute “stan-
dardized revenue” within a category for revenue deferential
in the spectral density regression.
We measure “concentration” using the Hirschman–
Herfindahl indexes. We define “volatility” as the sum of
SKU births and deaths in the data, expressed as a fraction of
the number of SKUS. We determined a birth by the appear-
ance of a SKU sometime over the duration of the data. We
determined a death by the disappearance of a SKU before
the end of the data. We convert each of these to a percentage
by dividing by the total number of SKUS. “Private-label
share” represents the share of the store brand computed
over the duration of the data. Finally, we obtain “interpur-
chase time” (in days) and “penetration” (as the percentage
of consumers using the category) from the Information
Resources Inc. factbook.
APPENDIX D: SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF
STRUCTURAL MODEL
We use the following demand equations for three brands
(ignoring demand shifters for the sake of explication),
(D1) qi = ai + bip1 + cip2 + dip3.
Then, profits for Brand 1 are given by (mp1 – mc1)q,
where mp1 is the manufacturer price of Brand 1 and mc1 is
the manufacturer cost. The derivative with respect to p1 is
given by  . This implies
(mp1 – mc1)(b1[∂p1/∂mp1]+  c 1[∂p2/∂mp1]+  d 1[∂p3/
∂mp1]) + q1 = 0. If p1 = mp1 + r1, where p is retail price and
r is markup, then (mp1 – mc1)(b1[1 + ∂r1/∂mp1]+  c 1[∂p2/
∂mp1]+  d 1[∂p3/∂mp1]) + q1 = 0. Setting ∂r1/∂mp1 = t1, ∂p2/
∂mp1 = t2, and ∂p3/∂mp1 = t3 implies that mp1 = mc1 –
q1(b1 + b1t1 + c1t2 + d1t3)–1. When t1, t2, and t3 are 0, we
observe Nash; however, these parameters are not separately
identified. Setting k1 = b1t1 + c1t2 + d1t3, we obtain mp1 =
mc1 – q1(b1 + k1)–1. Thus, if k1 differs from 0, the game is
not Nash (Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim 2000).
Note that k1 = 0 is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for Nash. Setting k1 = –(1/γ1)–  b 1 yields
(D2) mp1 = mc1 + γ1q1,
which is the estimation equation. After estimating γ1 and b1,
the variance of k1 can be inferred using the delta method. A
similar equation holds for the other brands. Note that γ is a
measure of relative margins insofar as the manufacturer
margin mp1 – mc1 = γ1q1.
Retailer profits are given by r1q1 + r2q2 + r3q3. Selecting
r1 to maximize profits implies that r1 ′q1 + r1q1 ′ + r2 ′q2 +
r2q2 ′ + r3 ′q3 + r3q3′ = 0. Thus, q1 + r1(b1[∂mp1/∂r1 + 1] +
c1∂mp2/∂r1 + d1∂mp3/∂r1)+  r 2(b2[∂mp1/∂r1 + 1] + c2∂mp2/
∂r1 + d2∂mp3/∂r1)+  r 3(b3[∂mp1/∂r1 + 1] + c3∂mp2/∂r1 +
d3∂mp3/∂r1) = 0. Again, noting that we cannot separately
identify the conduct parameters, we obtain r1 = –(b1 +
k4)–1q1 – (b2 + k5)(b1 + k4)–1r2 – (b3 + k6)(b1 + k4)–1r3,
where k4 = b1∂mp1/∂r1 + c1∂mp2/∂r1 + d1∂mp3/∂r1, k5 =
b2∂mp1/∂r1 + c2∂mp2/∂r1 + d2∂mp3/∂r1, and k6 = b3∂mp1/
∂r1 + c3∂mp2/∂r1 + d3∂mp3/∂r1. When k4, k5, k6 = 0, this is
() () mp mc q mp mc q 11 1 11 1 − ′ +− ′
Nash (Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim 2000). Setting
k4 = (–1 – α1b1)/α1, k5 = –b2 – α2(b1 + k4)=  – b 2 + α2/α1,
and k6 = –b3 – α3(b1 + k4)=  – b 3 – α3/α1 yields the estima-
tion equation,
(D3) r1 = α1q1 + α2r2 + α3r3,
which is linear. Together, equations D1–D3 form the system
in Equation 7.
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